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with ordering (e,g), (e,b), (u,g), (u,b). This implies probabilities of ﬁnding a job, conditional on
last period’s employment status and on the aggregate shocks in the current and in the last period.
These job-ﬁnding probabilities can be ranked from least to most lucky as follows: the probability
of becoming employed next period (0 = 1) is,
1. conditional on  = 0, z = g, and z0 = b, 0.0313/0.1250 = 0.2504 ≡¯ i1;
2. conditional on  = 0, z = b, and z0 = b, 0.3500/0.8750 = 0.4000 ≡¯ i2;
3. conditional on  = 0, z = g, and z0 = g, 0.5833/0.8750 = 0.6666 ≡¯ i3;
4. conditional on  = 0, z = b, and z0 = g, 0.0938/0.1250 = 0.7504 ≡¯ i4;
5. conditional on  = 1, z = g, and z0 = b, 0.1159/0.1250 = 0.9272 ≡¯ i5;
6. conditional on  = 1, z = b, and z0 = b, 0.8361/0.8750 = 0.9555 ≡¯ i6;
7. conditional on  = 1, z = g, and z0 = g, 0.8507/0.8750 = 0.9722 ≡¯ i7; and
8. conditional on  = 1, z = b, and z0 = g, 0.1229/0.1250 = 0.9832 ≡¯ i8.
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1Thus, our idiosyncratic shock it can end up in 9 relevant subintervals, deﬁned by the cutoﬀ values
¯ i1–¯ i9, in each period. Let us take an example: if i ∈ [¯ i6,¯ i7), the agent would have been employed
currently only if the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks leading up to the last period made the agent
employed in that period and the current aggregate state would have been bad (independently of
what the state was last period).
For a realized sequence of idiosyncratic shocks {is}t
s=1 one can then compute an average em-
ployment outcome in period t by brute-force averaging across all {zs}t
s=1 sequences (appropriately
weighted by probabilities): given each such sequence of aggregate shocks, together with an employ-
ment status in period 0, the employment outcomes in all periods up to and including t are known:
they follow applying the cutoﬀ values above in every time period.
The resulting employment process will have long memory in terms of the idiosyncratic shocks:
one generally needs to know all prior values of is, s < t, in order to know what the average
employment outcome is at t. However, it is possible to represent the new employment process
recursively. To this end, let Pgt denote the probability (or fraction of the time) that, among all
possible outcomes of the aggregate process, (i) the individual would have been employed in time
t, given his initial (time-0) employment status and an initial (time-0) value for the aggregate state
AND (ii) the aggregate state at time t would have been good. Similarly deﬁne Pbt as the probability
that the agent would have been employed in t jointly with a bad aggregate state in that period.
Letting πt denote the probability of a good aggregate state in period t given z0, these deﬁnitions
imply that πt −Pgt is the probability that the agent would have been unemployed in t jointly with
a good aggregate state in t and similarly that 1 − πt − Pbt is the probability that the agent would
have been unemployed in t jointly with a bad aggregate state in t. The key insight now is that
the variables Pt ≡ (Pgt,Pbt) summarize all there is to know from history in order to know the
expected (average) value for employment in period t+1 given a value for it+1. I.e., Pt summarizes
all the relevant knowledge about {i1,i2,...,it}. This representation is possible because the joint
underlying process for employment and the aggregate state is ﬁrst-order Markov.
The recursive structure needs to update Pt into Pt+1 given a value for it+1, and it needs to
assign a value for the average employment outcome in period t+1 conditional on the state variable
Pt summarizing the individual’s idiosyncratic history and it+1, the new idiosyncratic shock. The
latter is easy: the average value of employment across the aggregate shock outcomes will be 
w/o
t+1 =
Pg,t+1 + Pb,t+1, because g and b are disjoint outcomes.
To understand how to update Pt given it+1 (in order to obtain Pt+1), note that in any given
period in the economy with cycles the consumer is in one of four possible states: he is either
employed or unemployed and the aggregate state is either good or bad. Denote these states by
(1,g), (1,b), (0,g), and (0,b). (As noted above, the probabilities of these four states can be
deduced from knowledge of Pgt, Pbt, and the probability that the aggregate state is good in period
t.) Suppose that the consumer is in state (1,g) in period t and that the aggregate state in period
t+1 is also good. If the consumer’s luck in period t+1, it+1, is suﬃciently good, he will also be in
state (1,g) in period t+1. In this case, the consumer’s luck is “suﬃciently good” if it+1 < π1|1gg ≡
P(t+1 = 1|t = 1,zt = g,zt+1 = g). The conditional probability π1|1gg, therefore, is a “cutoﬀ”
2that determines whether the consumer’s luck is good or bad, given that he is employed in t and
that the aggregate state is good in both t and t + 1. In total, there are eight such cutoﬀs, one for
each of the eight possible permutations of (t,zt,zt+1), and these eight cutoﬀs deﬁne the 9 regions
described above.
In period t, the consumer could also be in state (1,b), (0,g), or (0,b). In each case, if the
aggregate state in period t + 1 is good and the consumer’s luck in t + 1 is below the relevant
cutoﬀ, he will be in state (1,g) in period t + 1. Pg,t+1 is then a weighted average of four indicator
functions (each of which indicates whether it+1 is above or below the appropriate cutoﬀ). The
weights corresponding to the period-t probabilities of the four states (1,g), (1,b), (0,g), and (0,b),
multiplied in each case by the conditional probability of transiting to a good aggregate state in
t + 1 given the aggregate state in t. Similarly, Pb,t+1 is also the weighted average of four indicator
functions, appropriately weighted.
As described above, in the baseline model the variable it+1 can fall into any one of the 9 regions
deﬁned by the cutoﬀs ¯ i1–¯ i9 above. The exact updating formulas for the baseline model are:
1. it+1 ∈ [0,¯ i1): Pg,t+1 = πt+1 and Pb,t+1 = 1 − πt+1;
2. it+1 ∈ [¯ i1,¯ i2): Pg,t+1 = πt+1 and Pb,t+1 = Pgtπb|g + (1 − πt)πb|b
3. it+1 ∈ [¯ i2,¯ i3): Pg,t+1 = πt and Pb,t+1 = Pgtπb|g + Pbtπb|b;
4. it+1 ∈ [¯ i3,¯ i4): Pg,t+1 = Pgtπg|g + (1 − πt)πg|b and Pb,t+1 = Pgtπb|g + Pbtπb|b;
5. it+1 ∈ [¯ i4,¯ i5): Pg,t+1 = Pgtπg|g + Pbtπg|b and Pb,t+1 = Pgtπb|g + Pbtπb|b;
6. it+1 ∈ [¯ i5,¯ i6): Pg,t+1 = Pgtπg|g + Pbtπg|b and Pb,t+1 = Pbtπb|b;
7. it+1 ∈ [¯ i6,¯ i7): Pg,t+1 = Pgtπg|g + Pbtπg|b and Pb,t+1 = 0;
8. it+1 ∈ [¯ i7,¯ i8): Pg,t+1 = Pbtπg|b and Pb,t+1 = 0; and
9. it+1 ∈ [¯ i8,1]: Pg,t+1 = Pb,t+1 = 0.
One needs to spell through these carefully to see that they are correct. We have, and for veriﬁcation
we have also (i) simulated this process for various draws of the idiosyncratic process {it}T
t=1 (where
T is large) and, based on the resulting {Pt}T
t=1 sequence, computed the associated employment
outcomes and (ii) made sure that the resulting values are replicated for the same {it}T
t=1 draws by
a brute-force averaging across aggregate shock processes. They do.
Appendix B displays the general updating formula (expressed as a weighted average of indicator
functions), for the baseline case (expressed as a weighted average of indicator functions), and
Appendix D displays it for the model with short- and long-term unemployment.
3B Computational algorithm for the benchmark model
B.1 General algorithm
This section outlines the computational algorithm applying the integration principle to our model
and computing the transition path.1 Note that the business cycle is eliminated in the beginning
of period 1, after all the period-1 shocks are realized. Thus z1 and ¯ k1 are given. At the individual
level, the distribution of k1, 1, and ˜ β1 are given from one point in the simulation that corresponds
to z1 and ¯ k1. 1 provides the initial conditions for each individuals: if z1 = g and 1 = 1, Pg1 = 1
and Pb1 = 0; if z1 = b and 1 = 1, Pg1 = 0 and Pb1 = 1; and if 1 = 0, Pg1 = 0 and Pb1 = 0. (Recall
that Pgt is the joint probability of zt = g and t = 1 and that Pbt is the joint probability of zt = b
and t = 1.)
The general computational strategy is to ﬁrst postulate the time path of aggregate capital,
solve for the agents’ decisions given this path, and then verify that that the time path for aggregate
capital implied by agents’ aggregated decisions matches the postulated time path.
We postulate the time path for 600 periods. Then we divide the 600 periods into the ﬁrst 125
periods and the ﬁnal 475 periods. We solve the consumer’s problem backwards—ﬁrst solve for the
ﬁnal 475 periods and then for the ﬁrst 125 periods. After the optimization problem is solved, we
simulate the economy with many consumers (we use 90,000 consumers) and generate the path for
aggregate capital by summing up individual savings. Finally, we check whether this simulated path
of capital stock is the same as the initially postulated time path. The following explains these steps
more in detail.
1. First, postulate the path of the aggregate capital stock for 600 periods. We use the average
of the law of motions of the capital stock in the ﬂuctuating economy to generate the initial
guess.
2. We solve the consumer’s problem backwards. In the ﬁnal 475 periods, the exogenous variables,
such as z, u, and πz are set to their limit values (z = 1, u = (ug +ub)/2, and πz = 0.5). Thus,
we treat this economy as a stationary on except for the movement in ¯ k (¯ k settles much more
slowly than do the exogenous variables). We summarize the movement of the capital stock
by the law of motion ¯ k0 = H(¯ k). In practice, we use a (log-)linear function for H(·), with the
initial value of the law of motion obtained by applying ordinary least squares to the data on
aggregate capital for the ﬁnal 475 periods. The Bellman equation is:
V (k,Pg,Pb, ˜ β;¯ k) = max
c,k0 {U(c) + ˜ βE[V (k0,P0
g,P0
b, ˜ β0;¯ k0)|Pg,Pb, ˜ β]}
subject to
c + k0 = r(¯ k,1 − ¯ u)k + w(¯ k,1 − ¯ u)(Pg + Pb) + g(1 − Pg − Pb) + (1 − δ)k,
1Also see Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005, Appendix C and D) for a detailed exposition of the implementation of
the integration principle. Note that Krusell and Smith (2002) and Mukoyama and S ¸ahin (2005, 2006) use Markov
approximations to the P processes while here we use the Ps directly in the computation.
4and
¯ k0 = H(¯ k).
As is explained in Appendix A, P0
g and P0
b are functions of a random variable i0 ∼ U[0,1].
P0
g(i0) = Pr[z0 = g,0 = 1|i0]
=
P
z=g,b[Pr[z0 = g,0 = 1|i0,z, = 1]Pz + Pr[z0 = g,0 = 1|i0,z, = 0](1/2 − Pz)]
=
P
z=g,b[Pr[0 = 1|i0,z0 = g,z, = 1]πg|zPz + Pr[0 = 1|i0,z0 = g,z, = 0]πg|z(1/2 − Pz)]
=
P
z=g,b[I(i0 ≤ π11|zg)πg|zPz + I(i0 ≤ π01|zg)πg|z(1/2 − Pz)]
and
P0
b(i0) = Pr[z0 = b,0 = 1|i0]
=
P
z=g,b[Pr[z0 = b,0 = 1|i0,z, = 1]Pz + Pr[z0 = b,0 = 1|i0,z, = 0](1/2 − Pz)]
=
P
z=g,b[Pr[0 = 1|i0,z0 = b,z, = 1]πb|zPz + Pr[0 = 1|i0,z0 = b,z, = 0]πb|z(1/2 − Pz)]
=
P
z=g,b[I(i0 ≤ π11|zb)πb|zPz + I(i0 ≤ π01|zb)πb|z(1/2 − Pz)],
where I(·) is the indicator function equaling 1 if the statement is true and 0 if it is false. Note
that this is just a compact way of writing the transition rules in Appendix A. The prices are:
r(¯ k,1 − ¯ u) = α¯ kα−1(1 − ¯ u)1−α
and
w(¯ k,1 − ¯ u) = (1 − α)¯ kα(1 − ¯ u)−α.
The expectation operator in the Bellman equation is taken over i0 and ˜ β0 values. In practice,
we divide the [0,1] into 4 × 2 + 1 = 9 subintervals when we take an expectation with respect
to the i0s, as is explained in Appendix A. The dynamic-programming problem is solved in
a similar way to that used in Krusell and Smith (1998). We use 6 grids in each P direction
(or, more precisely, on the conditional probability ˆ P, as is detailed below) and apply linear
interpolation to the value function when evaluating the values under P0 (which are usually
not on the grid).
3. For t = 1,...,125, we solve backwards for the path. Now the exogenous parameters move over
time and we treat each period diﬀerently (for example, the value function has the index t).
First, we provide the terminal value function: V126(k,Pg,Pb, ˜ β) = V (k,Pg,Pb, ˜ β;¯ k126), and
we then calculate the probability that the aggregate state is z at time t, πz
t, for t = 1,...,125:
π
g
1 = 1 if z1 = g and π
g
1 = 0 if z1 = b. It is always the case that πb







tπg|g + (1 − π
g
t)πg|b. zt can be calculated using zt = π
g
tg + (1 − π
g
t)b. ut can also be
calculated as zt = π
g
tug + (1 − π
g
t)ub. Thus the prices are
rt = αzt¯ kα−1
t (1 − ut)1−α
and
wt = (1 − α)zt¯ kα
t (1 − ut)−α.
5Given these, we can solve the consumer’s problem, working backwards. The Bellman equation
is:
Vt(k,Pg,Pb, ˜ β) = max
c,k0 {U(c) + ˜ βEt[Vt+1(k0,P0
g,P0
b, ˜ β0)|Pg,Pb, ˜ β]}
subject to
c + k0 = rtk + wt(Pg + Pb) + g(1 − Pg − Pb) + (1 − δ)k,
Again, P0
g and P0
b are functions of a random variable i0 ∼ U[0,1].
P0
g(i0) = Pr[z0 = g,0 = 1|i0]
=
P












b(i0) = Pr[z0 = b,0 = 1|i0]
=
P








z=g,b[I(i0 ≤ π11|zb)πb|zPz + I(i0 ≤ π01|zb)πb|z(πz
t − Pz)].
4. Having solved the consumer’s decision problem, we can simulate the economy. We assign an
initial distribution for the individual state variables and then simulate consumers’ decisions
(we use 90,000 consumers). Adding up the implied saving choices, we obtain the time series
for ¯ kt. Using this path, we check whether it reproduces the initially postulated path. If not,
we update ¯ k2,...,¯ k126 and the law of motion H(¯ k) by ordinary least squares. We repeat until
convergence.
B.2 Issues in actual implementation
In practice, we work on the conditional probabilities for Ps rather than with the joint probabilities.
We deﬁne ˆ Pz as the probability of being employed conditional on the aggregate state z. Here, in










The new problem becomes (with the new value function ˆ V )
ˆ V (k, ˆ Pg, ˆ Pb, ˜ β;¯ k) = max
c,k0 {U(c) + ˜ βE[ˆ V (k0, ˆ P0
g, ˆ P0
b, ˜ β0;¯ k0)| ˆ Pg, ˆ Pb, ˜ β]}
subject to



















+ (1 − δ)k,
6and
¯ k0 = H(¯ k).
From (1) and (2), ˆ P0
g(i0), ˆ P0






z=g,b[I(i0 ≤ π11|zg)πg|zPz + I(i0 ≤ π01|zg)πg|z(1/2 − Pz)]
=
P







z=g,b[I(i0 ≤ π11|zb)πb|zPz + I(i0 ≤ π01|zb)πb|z(1/2 − Pz)]
=
P
z=g,b[I(i0 ≤ π11|zb)πb|z ˆ Pz + I(i0 ≤ π01|zb)πb|z(1 − ˆ Pz)].
The advantage of using conditional probabilities is that we can ensure that the labor-income terms
in the budget constraint, w(¯ k,1 − ¯ u)( ˆ Pg/2 + ˆ Pb/2) and g(1 − ˆ Pg/2 − ˆ Pb/2), are positive as long
as ˆ Pg, ˆ Pb ∈ [0,1], and we can utilize the entire [0,1] domain for ˆ Pg and ˆ Pb. (Here, it is not a big
advantage since we can instead just restrict Pg,Pb ∈ [0,0.5]. However, the advantage is much larger
in the second step, since the corresponding domain becomes time-variant.)













Note that we have to be careful about the initial point—we cannot divide when πz
t = 0. To avoid
this, we can start from π
g
t = 1 − ε and πb
t = ε for a very small ε, for example.
The problem becomes
ˆ Vt(k, ˆ Pg, ˆ Pb, ˜ β) = max
c,k0 {U(c) + ˜ βEt[ˆ Vt+1(k0, ˆ P0
g, ˆ P0
b, ˜ β0)| ˆ Pg, ˆ Pb, ˜ β]}
subject to
c + k0 = rtk + wt(π
g
t ˆ Pg + πb
t ˆ Pb) + g(1 − π
g
t ˆ Pg − πb
t ˆ Pb) + (1 − δ)k.
Again, P0
g and P0















































































πb|z(1 − ˆ Pz)

.
7C Calculating the welfare gain
As in Lucas (1987), our measure of the welfare gain from eliminating the business cycle, λ, satisﬁes





















where β(j) is the discount factor from time j − 1 to j (known at time j) and β(0) = 1. β(1) is
known at time 0—it is an initial condition. ct is consumption in the economy with business cycles
and ˜ ct is consumption in the economy with business cycles.
λ can be calculated as follows.2
λ = exp
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D satisﬁes the following equation:



































D = (I − BΩ)−1I,
where I is the 3 × 3 identity matrix.
D Algorithm for the model with short- and long-run unemploy-
ment
D.1 Notation
Let  ∈ {l,f,s,e} denote long-term unemployment after the second unemployment period, long-
term unemployment in the ﬁrst unemployment period (“ﬁred”), short-term unemployment, and
employment, respectively. z = g is the good state and z = b is the bad state (from the second
consecutive period). The transition matrix for z is now
The individual employment states evolve according to the following matrices.






πll|gg πlf|gg πls|gg πle|gg
πfl|gg πff|gg πfs|gg πfe|gg
πsl|gg πsf|gg πss|gg πse|gg










0.50 0 0 0.50
0.50 0 0 0.50
0.25 0 0 0.75












πll|gb πlf|gb πls|gb πle|gb
πfl|gb πff|gb πfs|gb πfe|gb
πsl|gb πsf|gb πss|gb πse|gb










0.94 0 0 0.06
0.94 0 0 0.06
0.75 0 0 0.25










πll|bg πlf|bg πls|bg πle|bg
πfl|bg πff|bg πfs|bg πfe|bg
πsl|bg πsf|bg πss|bg πse|bg










0.17 0 0 0.83
0.17 0 0 0.83
0.03 0 0 0.97










πll|bb πlf|bb πls|bb πle|bb
πfl|bb πff|bb πfs|bb πfe|bb
πsl|bb πsf|bb πss|bb πse|bb










0.99 0 0 0.01
0.99 0 0 0.01
0.03 0 0 0.97






Computation of equilibrium for the economy with aggregate shocks is more involved than in the
homogeneous unemployment case, since now we have 3 aggregate states and 4 individual states,
but does not signiﬁcantly depart in complexity or diﬃculty from Krusell and Smith (1998).
9D.2 Transition dynamics
The general computational strategy is the same as for the case of homogeneous unemployment in
Appendix B, though it is more involved because of the many state variables.
1. First we postulate the path for the aggregate capital stock.
2. As in the previous section, we start from t ≥ 126. The Bellman equation is:
V (k,P, ˜ β;¯ k) = max
c,k0 {U(c) + ˜ βE[V (k0,P0, ˜ β0;¯ k0)|P, ˜ β]}
subject to













z + (1 − δ)k,
and
¯ k0 = H(¯ k).
Here, P is the vector of P
zs (the joint probability that the aggregate state is z and the
individual state is , if there were aggregate ﬂuctuations). We do not need to keep track of




b , and P
f
b as state variables.3 This is because
Pl




g = 0. P
















Calculating Pr[0|i0,z0,z,] is harder in this case. Before, we set Pr[0 = 1|i0,z0,z,] = 1 if
i0 ≤ π0|zz0 and zero otherwise; and Pr[0 = 0|i0,z0,z,] = 1 if i0 > π0|zz0 and zero otherwise.
Now we have four idiosyncratic states instead of two, so we adopt the following cutoﬀ rule:
Pr[0 = e|i0,z0,z,] =
(
1 if i0 ∈ [0,πe|zz0]
0 otherwise
Pr[0 = s|i0,z0,z,] =
(
1 if i0 ∈ (πe|zz0,πe|zz0 + πs|zz0]
0 otherwise
Pr[0 = f|i0,z0,z,] =
(
1 if i0 ∈ (πe|zz0 + πs|zz0,πe|zz0 + πs|zz0 + πf|zz0]
0 otherwise
Pr[0 = l|i0,z0,z,] =
(
1 if i0 ∈ (πe|zz0 + πs|zz0 + πf|zz0,1]
0 otherwise
.
We keep the structure that a low i is “lucky” and a high i is “unlucky.” In the computation,
we divide the interval of possible is in [0,1] into subintervals by these cutoﬀ thresholds when
we take expectations in the Bellman equation.
3Note that here we do not need to make distinctions between the zb state and the zd state.
10Again, in the actual computation, we work with conditional probabilities (but not conditional









































t(1 − ˆ Pe
b )(1 − ˆ Ps
b )
. (10)
Then, the problem becomes
ˆ V (k, ˆ P, ˜ β;¯ k) = max
c,k0 {U(c) + ˜ βE[V (k0, ˆ P0, ˜ β0;¯ k0)|ˆ P, ˜ β]}
subject to
c + k0 = r(¯ k,1 − ¯ u)k + Iw + Iu1 + Iu2 + (1 − δ)k
and
¯ k0 = H(¯ k).
Here,





















t(1 − ˆ Pe
z) ˆ Ps
z + πb
t(1 − ˆ Pe
b )(1 − ˆ Ps


























b + (1 − ˆ Pe
b ) ˆ Ps
b + (1 − ˆ Pe
b )(1 − ˆ Ps





The evolution of ˆ P
z can be obtained from the above relationships. In particular, we can
convert ˆ Ps into Ps using the equations (6)-(10), calculate the transition of Ps by (5), and
transform the Ps back to ˆ Ps using (6)-(10) once again. Here, since all the exogenous variables
are already settled, we can use πz
t = 1/2.
Again, the advantage of working on the conditional distributions is that we can ensure that
Iw, Iu1, and Iu2 are all positive for ˆ Pe
g, ˆ Pe
b , ˆ Ps
g, ˆ Ps
b , ˆ P
f
b ∈ [0,1]. We put 5 grid points in each
ˆ P direction and linearly interpolate the value functions when evaluating the value at ˆ P0.
3. The other steps are similar to those in Appendix B. For the ﬁrst 125 periods, πz
t changes






E.1 One type of unemployment
Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 0.861 0.261 0.070 −0.050 −0.093 0.228 1.088 1.689
 = 1 0.263 0.156 0.045 −0.057 −0.096 0.228 1.090 1.691
 = 0 1.691 0.671 0.254 0.033 −0.057 0.233 1.067 1.643
Average utility gains by wealth group (¯ k = 11.2, z = zb)
Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 0.278 0.175 0.043 −0.059 −0.078 0.219 0.993 1.552
 = 1 0.247 0.166 0.040 −0.060 −0.078 0.219 0.994 1.551
 = 0 0.579 0.345 0.113 −0.013 −0.054 0.201 0.979 1.531
Average utility gains by wealth group (¯ k = 12.3, z = zg)
Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 0.393 0.207 0.050 −0.056 −0.079 0.224 1.020 1.577
 = 1 0.250 0.171 0.035 −0.064 −0.083 0.226 1.022 1.566
 = 0 0.821 0.416 0.169 0.012 −0.044 0.206 1.000 1.667
Average utility gains by wealth group (¯ k = 12.3, z = zb)
Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = 1, β = low 0.636 0.470 0.303 0.080 0.432 1.202 1.510
 = 1, β = middle 0.316 0.181 0.046 −0.095 0.668 1.479 1.787
 = 1, β = high 0.120 0.033 −0.022 0.014 1.041 1.864 2.176
 = 0, β = low 3.808 1.867 0.732 0.182 0.419 1.199 1.509
 = 0, β = middle 2.890 1.314 0.390 −0.033 0.653 1.476 1.787
 = 0, β = high 2.107 0.884 0.183 0.006 1.025 1.860 2.175
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 11.2, z = zb)
12Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = 1, β = low 0.563 0.356 0.241 0.099 0.369 1.069 1.338
 = 1, β = middle 0.264 0.090 0.010 −0.076 0.599 1.343 1.613
 = 1, β = high 0.089 0.001 −0.007 0.040 0.970 1.723 1.995
 = 0, β = low 1.508 0.644 0.420 0.164 0.360 1.067 1.337
 = 0, β = middle 1.034 0.321 0.138 −0.039 0.588 1.340 1.612
 = 0, β = high 0.681 0.131 0.033 0.022 0.959 1.720 1.995
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 12.3, z = zg)
Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = 1, β = low 0.648 0.364 0.228 0.094 0.386 1.107 1.382
 = 1, β = middle 0.328 0.095 0.008 −0.080 0.619 1.382 1.659
 = 1, β = high 0.134 0.004 −0.009 0.035 0.992 1.765 2.044
 = 0, β = low 3.022 0.850 0.507 0.188 0.375 1.104 1.381
 = 0, β = middle 2.259 0.487 0.208 −0.024 0.605 1.380 1.658
 = 0, β = high 1.625 0.256 0.074 0.015 0.977 1.762 2.043
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 12.3, z = zb)
13E.2 Short- and long-term unemployment
Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 7.415 2.640 1.225 0.525 0.397 1.136 4.463 6.960
 = e 1.504 0.917 0.825 0.336 0.267 1.092 4.464 6.951
 = s 2.057 1.221 1.096 0.453 0.348 1.167 4.509 6.749
 = f 14.512 9.071 6.059 3.020 2.355 1.746 4.566 6.976
 = l 18.973 10.971 6.335 3.205 2.555 1.719 4.253 7.098
Average utility gains by wealth group (¯ k = 11.3, z = zd)
Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 20.632 9.994 1.325 0.421 0.332 1.137 4.233 6.595
 = e 1.579 1.417 0.917 0.393 0.323 1.116 4.237 6.580
 = s 1.958 1.139 0.510 0.411 1.080 4.074 6.614
 = l 20.804 11.068 6.805 3.290 2.437 1.676 4.249 6.673
Average utility gains by wealth group4 (¯ k = 11.3, z = zb)
Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 2.092 1.684 0.838 0.456 0.392 1.135 4.264 6.672
 = e 1.727 1.599 0.795 0.432 0.377 1.131 4.270 6.670
 = s 3.207 3.057 1.613 0.925 0.791 1.210 4.062 6.811
 = l 4.830 3.810 1.861 1.278 1.091 1.371 4.213 5.937
Average utility gains by wealth group (¯ k = 12.1, z = zg)
Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 3.385 2.010 1.026 0.576 0.447 1.148 4.212 6.627
 = e 1.493 1.414 0.680 0.373 0.323 1.107 4.194 6.629
 = s 1.925 1.722 0.855 0.472 0.410 1.106 4.301 6.827
 = f 9.100 8.185 4.679 2.936 2.435 1.615 4.347 6.246
 = l 11.167 8.670 4.504 3.141 2.645 1.690 4.502 6.460
Average utility gains by wealth group (¯ k = 12.1, z = zd)
4In the simulated data, there are no agents with  = s and asset holdings below the ﬁrst percentile.
14Utility gain in percentage consumption
< 1 1–5 5–25 25–50 50–75 75–95 95–99 > 99
All 5.339 2.153 1.188 0.594 0.361 1.137 4.215 6.620
 = e 1.517 1.424 0.704 0.372 0.323 1.104 4.212 6.596
 = s 1.777 1.713 0.894 0.481 0.413 1.211 4.052 6.989
 = l 11.122 8.517 4.411 3.143 2.663 1.637 4.304 6.655
Average utility gains by wealth group (¯ k = 12.1, z = zb)
Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = e, β = low 1.960 1.844 1.524 0.885 1.191 4.017 5.101
 = e, β = middle 1.062 0.957 0.695 0.277 2.089 5.540 6.669
 = e, β = high 0.636 0.615 0.612 0.884 4.353 8.033 9.212
 = s, β = low 2.749 2.508 1.904 1.027 1.181 4.014 5.104
 = s, β = middle 1.685 1.477 0.988 0.370 2.071 5.537 6.668
 = s, β = high 1.054 0.922 0.744 0.879 4.331 8.030 9.212
 = f, β = low 22.119 16.464 10.074 4.093 1.191 4.008 5.102
 = f, β = middle 16.336 12.143 7.258 2.551 1.996 5.529 6.670
 = f, β = high 10.755 7.913 4.497 1.606 4.218 8.020 9.213
 = l, β = low 30.194 21.159 11.223 4.333 1.182 4.006 5.101
 = l, β = middle 22.226 15.627 8.150 2.737 1.982 5.527 6.669
 = l, β = high 14.676 10.277 5.125 1.683 4.200 8.018 9.212
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 11.3, z = zd)
Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = e, β = low 2.066 1.981 1.643 0.966 1.155 3.606 4.617
 = e, β = middle 1.153 1.076 0.793 0.338 1.940 5.052 6.112
 = e, β = high 0.663 0.644 0.625 0.861 4.072 7.429 8.527
 = s, β = low 2.865 2.685 2.039 1.113 1.153 3.603 4.616
 = s, β = middle 1.778 1.628 1.099 0.436 2.021 5.048 6.111
 = s, β = high 1.085 0.984 0.768 0.860 4.191 7.425 8.526
 = l, β = low 30.340 23.461 11.716 4.471 1.161 3.593 4.616
 = l, β = middle 22.347 17.335 8.539 2.850 2.038 5.035 6.110
 = l, β = high 14.728 11.397 5.371 1.711 4.211 7.409 8.526
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 11.3, z = zb)
15Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = e, β = low 2.469 1.833 1.632 1.051 1.126 3.703 4.812
 = e, β = middle 1.451 0.927 0.775 0.390 1.995 5.179 6.338
 = e, β = high 0.861 0.727 0.730 0.904 4.209 7.613 8.821
 = s, β = low 5.854 3.526 2.994 1.700 1.121 3.699 4.813
 = s, β = middle 4.056 2.215 1.797 0.834 1.967 5.174 6.339
 = s, β = high 2.575 1.413 1.218 1.011 4.171 7.607 8.822
 = l, β = low 8.334 4.741 3.966 2.141 1.111 3.695 4.812
 = l, β = middle 5.969 3.162 2.545 1.143 1.941 5.169 6.338
 = l, β = high 4.056 1.964 1.604 1.080 4.138 7.602 8.821
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 12.1, z = zg)
Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = e, β = low 2.052 1.588 1.433 0.964 1.115 3.621 4.598
 = e, β = middle 1.144 0.750 0.635 0.333 1.967 5.069 6.093
 = e, β = high 0.661 0.627 0.651 0.860 4.138 7.455 8.515
 = s, β = low 2.781 1.949 1.728 1.108 1.105 3.619 4.597
 = s, β = middle 1.722 1.030 0.858 0.430 1.949 5.066 6.092
 = s, β = high 1.052 0.751 0.732 0.858 4.117 7.451 8.514
 = f, β = low 21.258 9.674 7.974 4.172 1.120 3.611 4.598
 = f, β = middle 15.720 6.961 5.627 2.619 1.882 5.056 6.092
 = f, β = high 10.330 4.269 3.347 1.609 4.012 7.451 8.512
 = l, β = low 27.883 10.670 8.656 4.405 1.112 3.609 4.597
 = l, β = middle 20.573 7.737 6.164 2.800 1.868 5.053 6.091
 = l, β = high 13.572 4.817 3.715 1.685 3.997 7.435 8.511
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 12.1, z = zd)
16Wealth percentile
Type of agent constr. 0.005 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.995 0.999
 = e, β = low 2.060 1.609 1.439 0.964 1.107 3.621 4.647
 = e, β = middle 1.149 0.766 0.639 0.334 1.963 5.074 6.147
 = e, β = high 0.671 0.635 0.660 0.872 4.144 7.469 8.583
 = s, β = low 2.790 1.977 1.734 1.109 1.098 3.618 4.645
 = s, β = middle 1.729 1.051 0.862 0.430 1.946 5.070 6.146
 = s, β = high 1.063 0.763 0.742 0.869 4.123 7.466 8.582
 = l, β = low 27.910 10.884 8.661 4.389 1.105 3.608 4.646
 = l, β = middle 20.592 7.903 6.167 2.787 1.865 5.058 6.145
 = l, β = high 13.591 4.940 3.723 1.688 4.003 7.450 8.580
Utility gains for diﬀerent types of agents (¯ k = 12.1, z = zb)
References
Krusell, P. & A.A. Smith, Jr. (1998), Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy.
Journal of Political Economy 106, 867–896.
Krusell, P. & A.A. Smith, Jr. (2002), Revisiting the Welfare Eﬀects of Eliminating Business
Cycles. Manuscript. University of Rochester and Carnegie-Mellon University.
Lucas, R.E., Jr. (1987), Models of Business Cycles. Basil Blackwell, New York.
Mukoyama, T. & A. S ¸ahin (2005), Costs of Business Cycles for Unskilled Workers, CIREQ
working paper 15-2005.
Mukoyama, T. & A. S ¸ahin (2006), Costs of Business Cycles for Unskilled Workers, Journal
of Monetary Economics 53, 2179–2193.
17